Lexington Books
Pages: 177
Trim: 6½ x 9¼
978-1-4985-6221-8 • Hardback • May 2018 • $111.00 • (£85.00)
978-1-4985-6222-5 • eBook • May 2018 • $105.50 • (£82.00)
Franklin Barr Lebo is assistant professor of sustainability and faculty in the Asian Studies Program at Baldwin Wallace University.
Introduction and Research Design
Chapter 1: Structure of the Japanese Government
Chapter 2: Case Study 1: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC)
Chapter 3: Case Study 2: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
Chapter 4: Case Study 3: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLITT)
Chapter 5: Case Study 4: Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW)
Chapter 6: Case Study 5: Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
Conclusions and Areas for Further Study
Appendix: Additional Tables
This is a substantial work of original research and synthesis around the idea of bureaucratic drift and the conditions under which officials in Japan’s ministries exercise enhanced bureaucratic discretion in the implementation of government policy. It contains valuable new perspectives on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Japan and, more broadly, the important link between democracy and bureaucracy.
— Aurelia George Mulgan, Australian Defence Force Academy
This book applies principal-agent theory to Japanese national public administration. Its working hypothesis is that in Japanese politics (in this sense modeled on the UK system) politicians decide policy and public servants implement it. In practice, of course, things are more complicated, since in Japan particularly (but elsewhere as well), government officials provide much original input into policy making. We find here much useful empirical material, including a well researched analysis of the National Personnel Authority, on which rather little has been published in English.
— Arthur Stockwin, University of Oxford